

NOTER

- 1) Följande förkortningar av Kjelléns verk används:
- NS - Nationell samling, Stockholm 1906
 - PE - Politiska essayer, Samling I-III, Stockholm 1914-1915
 - SL - Staten som livsform, Stockholm 1916
 - SM - Stormakterna, del I-IV, Stockholm 1911-1913
 - Sv - Sverige, Stockholm 1917
 - VPP - Världskrigets politiska problem, Stockholm 1915
- 2) I - exempelvis - kurser i "analysinriktningar" inom forskarutbildningen bör utrymme beredas för Kjellén. Ett lämpligt urval av hans skrifter vore SL plus SM, del III-IV. Forskare med inriktning mot internationell politik bör inte försumma att läsa hela SM, I-IV.

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Douglas Hibbs:

SOME IMPRESSIONS OF SWEDISH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SCIENCE

I imagine that I am the only American (and, in modern times, possibly the only person) ever to serve both as professor of political science and professor of economics in Sweden and, based on that experience, the editors of *Politologen* have asked me to write about some of my impressions of political and economic science in this country. Let me begin with some disclaimers. My fields are the political economies of the western democracies and applied econometrics and statistical modeling. Although I have done research on Swedish topics (my current work focuses on the fiscal system and income distribution in Sweden), I am not a specialist on Sweden or the Nordic area. My impressions of Swedish political science and economics are therefore heavily constrained by the limitations of my interests and experience.

Sweden is a rich country with a large and powerful public sector. And, luckily for those in science, research is one of the darlings of the Swedish state. A foreigner is immediately impressed by the quantity and quality of research facilities in Sweden, which stands in sharp contrast to the sad state of affairs in, say, Mrs. Thatcher's Britain or, to a lesser degree, at many institutions in Ronald Reagan's America. It is my impression that any qualified Swedish social scientist who wants to pursue a research career is unlikely to find the local infrastructure wanting or external funding in short supply. In these respects the research environment in Sweden compares favorably even with America's most prestigious and richly endowed academic institutions; certainly the ones I am well acquainted with (MIT and Harvard).

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Moreover, Swedish arrangements cope well with the fundamental constraints imposed by a small population residing in a geographically large country. For example, library resources at Swedish universities and institutes are generally quite modest, but an efficient national cataloging and distribution system greatly ameliorates the problem, though of course it is not overcome completely. Sweden's political decision to decentralize educational facilities, which I gather was taken so that the Swedish world of advanced training and research does not become one big hinterland of Stockholm, poses larger difficulties. In a nation of just over eight millions committed to maintaining five or six full-blown university centers distributed across the country, individual departments inevitably will be small in scale and limited in range. And, despite (unofficial) attempts to have departments specialize to some extent in particular areas of the various disciplines, only rarely does one find a "critical mass" of academic talent working in the same subfield at the same institute. (In some fields Stockholm is an exception.)

The problem of (small) scale is partly overcome by the ready availability of travel funds for students and teachers alike. But only partly; not every Swedish doctoral student goes abroad for supplementary training, and not every student can conveniently fill the gaps with courses available out-of-town at home. I have met a number of Swedish doctoral students in both politics and economics who have never had (and plainly never will have) advanced, professional level training in central areas of their discipline. The explanation is obvious enough: Swedish institutes simply have too few senior Professors to provide the range of advanced teaching and research advising that is absolutely standard at the major American centers of doctoral training. Barring a reversal of the understandable political decision to decentralize resources, Swedish graduate training will probably always suffer to some degree from the limited depth and range of most doctoral programs.

The shortage of senior Professors probably helps account for what strikes me as the overly long gestation period for many doctoral

thesis projects. (I base this observation on mere impression; I have no hard data.) And I would conjecture that Swedish social scientists are less likely than many of their colleagues abroad to stray away from their initial areas of specialization (thesis research areas) during the course of their careers because as doctoral students they frequently do not acquire advanced training in a wide enough range of areas to facilitate such transitions later on. Such immobility is neither rewarding for individuals nor good for the collective progress of Swedish social science. I suspect it is less pronounced, however, in economics than politics, because economic theory is more formalized, the essentials can be conveyed at an advanced level by a few solid, core courses in macro- and especially micro-economics, and command of the core of economic theory allows one to make original contributions over quite a broad terrain.

Another potential problem of resource mobilization and utilization in Sweden stems from the peculiar Swedish practices regarding access to micro data on individuals, most notably data from interview-surveys. As I understand it, principal investigators and their teams are able to keep control of important national data resources, the acquisition of which is typically financed by public monies, for very long periods of time. In some cases concern for the privacy of individual respondents seems to be one of the reasons. But technology has rendered meaningless a privacy rationalization of the monopolization of micro data; it is a trivial affair with modern electronic data management methods to epurgate any information in micro data files that might permit identification of individuals.

Principal investigator control of expensive and sometimes unique data resources means that scientific replication and competition may be inhibited. An "outsider", say, a gifted young student not part of the privileged team who may have better ideas about organizing and analyzing the data, is able pursue his or her research only by fiat of "insiders". Scientific protectionism can retard the development of science just as much as economic protectionism can retard the development of the economy. Although

I do not believe that data hoarding has been in practice an important obstacle to the progress of Swedish social science research, competition and replication are so essential to a vigorous science that a potential problem of this sort should not be permitted to exist even in principle. This is why privileged access by University of Michigan "insiders" to the American national election study surveys was eliminated about ten years ago when the U.S. National Science Foundation agreed to supply secure, long-run financing of this important social science data program.

Next, I would like to make some observations about the parochialism and internationalism of Swedish political and economic science. As in most western countries, Swedish social science has been profoundly influenced by developments in the United States. Since I think it accurate to say that in the postwar era America generally has set the scientific pace internationally, Sweden's attentiveness to US scientific trends, in combination with its own rich traditions and strong commitment to research, helps account for the fact that Swedish science has an international projection that in most fields is out of all proportion to the size of the country's population.

Yet, in my opinion too careful adherence to American scientific fashion, that is, a scientific posture that is too "international", may sometimes inhibit original contribution. For example (and at this point I must proceed "by example", which is not good science), a visitor from the United States (at least, this visitor) is immediately struck by the importance of equality in Swedish economic and political life; in political rhetoric, in more deeply rooted ideology, and in tangible, observable distributive outcomes. (During the last few years the commitment to equality has diminished; I try to explain why in my recent paper "Fiscal Influences on Trends in Wage Dispersion in Sweden".) Concerning observables, both pre- and post- tax and transfer income is more equally distributed in Sweden than in any society for which we have reliable data. An important source of this equality of economic well-being (in fact, the most important source) is the enormous compression of wages and salaries

achieved by the Swedish unions' pursuit of "solidaristic" wage bargaining goals; goals that until recently placed overriding weight on wage equality.

When I began my own research on postwar wage formation in Sweden I was astonished to discover that distributional objectives play essentially no role in analyses of Swedish trade union behavior by Swedish economists. Economic analysis of unions in Sweden follows very closely the standard bargaining/gaming models developed in the United States and England in which the arguments of union utility functions (the variables believed to govern union behavior) are confined largely to employment and wage levels. Here I think that Swedish economists would be better served by extending or modifying (or, perhaps, even scraping altogether) "international" styles of analysis to accommodate what is special about Sweden. In other words, a more "parochial" outlook in this and other instances might well lead to more enduring original contributions than replication of standard international set-ups.

Analogously, the bulk of research on political attitudes and behavior in Sweden by Swedish political scientists seems to be based on the familiar Ann Arbor-inspired variables and styles of analysis, which (for very good reasons) have been so influential in Europe as well as in America. To be sure the Swedish electoral behavior program, which is centered, thanks to the early leadership of Jorgen Westerståhl and Bo Särilvik and the subsequent efforts of Soren Holmberg and associates, at the Göteborg political science department, is a first-rate operation indeed. (It is a real loss for the international research community, however, that during the last decade the program's main contributions have appeared only in the Swedish language.) Yet, one of the aspects of Sweden that is so special, the postwar commitment to equality, as far as I know has received only peripheral treatment from Swedish behavioral political science. As in my earlier example, I believe the absence of a more "parochial" orientation here too may underlie a missed opportunity. In fact, the major analysis of equality in Sweden

from a comparative, behavioral political science perspective was only recently published by a non-Swedish team headed by the American political scientist Sidney Verba.

I shall conclude this essay with some remarks on the status of interdisciplinary relations in Sweden and the United States, in particular, relations between my own fields of politics and economics. Building on the older, more specialized field of "public choice", interest in the intersection of politics and economics has skyrocketed during the last dozen years. "Political economy" now is an institutionalized research and teaching field with its own journals, conferences, research culture and status hierarchy. Yet, despite the fact that political and economic science are naturally suited to productive interdisciplinary collaboration, relations between the two disciplines, though improved somewhat in recent years, remain appallingly underdeveloped in Sweden (and the rest of Europe) and in the United States. Oddly, the main linkage between the professions occurs internationally rather than intranationally: namely, between American political scientists and European economists. Let me explain why.

Within the United States the lack of meaningful sustained contact between the disciplines stems, I believe, largely from the rather "tight" training and associated narrow intellectual outlook of the American economics profession. Work that strays from the core of conventional economics is neither encouraged nor professionally rewarded in the U.S. And I doubt this will be changed much by the 1986 Nobel award to James Buchanan for this work in constitutional economics/public choice. Indeed, some top American economists hold the (arrogant and parochial) view that the Clark medal - awarded every other year to the American economist under forty years who is judged to have made the most significant contributions to economics - is more desirable than the Nobel because the later prize does not reliably go to outstanding economists, which means to economists in the mainstream of the discipline's core. (Examples, by this line of reasoning, of "mistakes" that dilute the Nobel's prestige would be Buchanan, Simon, and von Hayek and, perhaps, even Myrdal.)

Consequently, political economy in the U.S. is dominated by political scientists, many of whom are as well trained technically and theoretically as American economists. Of course a number of U.S. economists have made exceptional contributions to political economy, but I can think of no top-ranked American economist who is so regarded by his peers because of work in the political economy area.

Within Europe (and now I think it is best to speak of Europe as a whole and not just Sweden), on the other hand, political economy is dominated by economists. For example, the annual meeting of the European public choice society (which is essentially an organization of European political economists, not only pure public choice specialists) is generally attended by only a handful of political scientists. The explanation, I think, is that European economists are more broadly trained and have broader interests than American economists (in this regard, however, the Swedish economics profession is probably more like the U.S. profession than those on the continent), and European political scientists tend to be somewhat less well trained in formal theory and method than American political scientists. By virtue of their interests and training, it is not surprising that European economists therefore have taken charge of the political economy turf outside the United States.

It should now be clear why cross-disciplinary exchanges, in political economy and other fields involving economic and political dimensions, largely take place between American political scientists and European economists. Nominal inhabitants of both disciplines share an interest in the subject matter and no barriers to serious scientific communication are posed by asymmetries in basic methodological or theoretical skills and preferences. (It was once true in the United States, as it still largely is true in Europe, that economists generally had superior training in mathematics, econometrics-statistics and formal analysis, which presented nearly insurmountable obstacles to collaboration with political scientists.) No doubt this is why in the late 1970s when I organized a pair of Euro-American conferences

on 'political-economic models and cycles', all but one of the European participants were economists and all but one of the American participants came from the ranks of political science. More recently, Johan Lybeck had roughly the same experience when he organized international conferences on 'the growth of government in developed democracies', a topic that clearly invites interdisciplinary exchange more than most.

Concerning the future, I would think Sweden is a country where interdisciplinary research in political economy might thrive. In a nation where government consumes and transfers such an enormous fraction of national income, where public regulations and controls touch so many aspects of life, and where the political goals of fairness and equality have loomed so large relative to the economic norm of efficiency, politics has special importance for economics. Likewise, in a small open economy that is so exposed to international economic influences and events, and where the private economy (and in a very real sense Sweden's economic future) is so dominated by a small number of large firms, unions and industrial alliances, economics has special relevance for politics and, in particular, for the degrees of freedom available to political decision-makers.

Sweden, then, is a natural place for activity in the political economy field to prosper. But within-discipline disincentives to serious interdisciplinary collaboration are strong, perhaps more so within the community of academic economists than academic political scientists. In both communities, however, one's professional standing and advancement still depend primarily on attracting the attention and gaining the respect of one's disciplinary peers rather than on impressing people from the other side.

Johan A Lybeck:

VAD ÄR STATSVETARE RESP EKONOMER BRA PÅ?

Inledning

Våra svenska akademiska ämnen blir allt mer uppsplittrade. Statsvetenskap i lika hög grad som nationalekonomi är ett ämne som varit bortskämt med att vara ett brett ämne. Vi är också båda gamla ämnen med anor från 1700-talet, för att inte säga från "de gamla grekerna". Därför känns det lite frustrerande att nu konfronteras med politikernas benägenhet att satsa på "pop-ämnen" såsom förvaltning, freds- och konfliktforskning m m konstifika-tioner på den statsvetenskapliga sidan, och regionalekonomi, "Money and Banking", m m som håller på att brytas ut från nationalekonomin.

Självfallet leder denna process mot allt snävare ämnen också till motsvarande behov av samordning mellan de nya ämnena. Men jag vill även mena - och det är huvudtemat för denna uppsats - att också de traditionella ämnena nationalekonomi och statskunskap har stora behov av varandra. Korsbefrukning är definitivt av godol

Vad kan nationalekonomerna?

Nationalekonomens forte är abstrakt analys. Nationalekonomen fnyser åt företagsekonomens "case studies", som hon/han menar kommer att ha ett högst begränsat värde i en föränderlig värld. I stället menar nationalekonomerna att deras analys har en högre grad av allmängiltighet; det är mera frågan om att lära sig ett sätt att tänka.

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